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II. OBJECTIONS TO ORVIS5 STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Orvis' Appellee's Brief makes numerous mis-statements of fact which should be corrected 
at the outset. Space permits only the more flagrant to be corrected here. Orvis, at page 7, inserts a 
quote from the SBA deposition (again entirely out of context) to the effect that Johnson, because of 
his bar problem, stepped down from Lexington Law Firm. Orvis neglects to disclose that at this 
same time that Johnson entered into the agreement stepping down from Lexington Law Firm, Orvis 
executed a memorandum of partnership with Johnson affirming the partnership in all Orvis/Johnson 
credit repair businesses. Lexington Law Firm is not the partnership in issue, but one of the 
partnership's activities was to operate the marketing for such law firm. Both the partnership 
agreement with Orvis, and the resignation from Lexington, were attached as exhibits to Johnson's 
affidavit in opposition to Orvis' summary judgment and this was specifically argued to Judge 
Hanson below (R. 2266-2515). Moreover, Orvis himself is not a lawyer and cannot be a partner in 
a law firm nor control it. Such is a clear violation of law. Orvis' claim that by his resignation from 
Lexington, Orvis somehow proves that Johnson abandoned an Orvis business, would seem to be a 
tacit admission that he views the law firm as his. 
Another example on page 9 and elsewhere, Orvis argues that the "sole" evidence in 
opposition to his Motion for Summary Judgment was merely an affidavit and implies that it contains 
no substantive proof in opposition. Orvis neglects to note that there were 19 exhibits with the 
affidavit including specific deposition testimony adduced in this case supporting the partnership, and 
documenting Orvis' embezzlement and use of partnership funds to purchase the SBA judgment; and 
including evidence of the profit share from the partnership divided between the Johnsons and Orvis, 
etc. The affidavit contains a wide range of proof well beyond that necessary to establish the 




ISSUE NO. 1: THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT CORRECTLY 
CONSTRUE AND APPLY THE RESPECTIVE PROCEDURAL BURDENS 
BORNE BY OPPOSING PARTIES ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
a, Orvis never properly factually supported each element of judicial estoppel. 
therefore no prima facie case was set forth to shift any burden to Johnson, 
There is a fundamental flaw in Orvis' argument that pervades his entire brief. It is this: 
Orvis' repeated argument is summed up by his quote from Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar 
Co., 54 P.3d 1054 (Utah 2002) on p. 20 of his Brief, "In Waddoups... the moving party met 
its initial burden by pointing out that plaintiffs did not have proof sufficient to meet an 
essential element of their... claims." [Emphasis added]. This may or may not be the correct 
statement of the law, but Orvis, the moving party, entirely failed to do what he claims a 
moving party must do. Orvis' summary judgment motion below did not once address any 
element of Johnson's partnership claim or discuss elements of partnerships nor attempt to 
negate their existence. While Johnson provided overwhelming evidence of the partnership, 
documentary and witness testimony, some 19 exhibits laid out in his Affidavit Opposing 
Summary Judgment (R. 2266-2515) including everything from express written partnership 
agreements to years of partnership profit sharing to deposition testimony of Orvis employees 
that he was embezzling partnership funds from the Johnson, Orvis never to begin with 
addresses any element of the partnership doctrine that would have operated to shift any 
burden to Johnson. 
The elements of a partnership have been amply defined by this Court. As the Court 
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of Appeals stated in Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 135 P.3d 904 (Utah App.2006): 
The "basic principle of partnership law is set forth in our Uniform Partnership Act, 
Title 48 of U.C.A.1953 ." Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Utah 1975). " 
'Partnership ' is defined as 'an association of two or more persons to carry on a 
business for profit.' " Parduhn v. Bennett, 2002 UT 93,1114, 61 P.3d 982 (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 (1998)). The requirements for 
establishing the existence of a partnership are not exactly defined, but certain 
elements are essential: The parties must combine their property, money, effects, skill, 
labor and knowledge. As a general rule, there must be a community of interest in the 
performance of the common purpose, a joint propriety interest in the subject matter, 
a mutual right to control, a right to share profits, and unless there is an agreement to 
the contrary, a duty to share in any losses which may be sustained. Bassett v. Baker, 
530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974). 
More tellingly, this Court in Cheves v. Williams, 993 P.2d 191 (Utahl999) specifically 
held that whether a partner proclaims or disavows existence of a partnership is of no avail 
because the existence of the partnership is determined under partnership law, not what the 
partners say about it. Nowhere is an inconsistent statement (or a consistent one) an element 
of the doctrine of partnership. Indeed, as recognized in Cheves, individuals inadvertently or 
knowingly assert or disaffirm partnerships regularly without affecting whether there is indeed 
an actual partnership under the law. While Johnson has credibly shown that Orvis' distorted 
SBA deposition quote does not mean at all what Orvis would have it mean, nonetheless even 
if the evidence is weighed, intent and credibility assessed to accept Orvis' interpretation as 
was done by the Court of Appeals, that quote does not go to the "essential elements" of a 
partnership claim. Partners often accurately or inaccurately make statements that there is or 
is not a partnership to the IRS, to banks, lenders, creditors, ex-wives, CPA's, gambling 
commissions, etc. However, a partnership is proven by none of these, but rather by the 
elements of partnership law regardless of what individuals may say that is consistent or 
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inconsistent. Indeed, if partners could create, alter or break a partnerships and avoid 
accounting and cover embezzlement simply by an inconsistent or consistent statement, 
partnership litigation would be full of such self-serving statements. 
Thus, the fundamental deficiency of Orvis' summary judgment motion is a threshold 
one amply condemned by Orvis' own argument here. He omitted to address, in his summary 
judgment motion any actual element of the partnership claim. His motion only dealt with an 
alleged inconsistent statement by Johnson. However, even if we assume Orvis' self-serving, 
claim of a belatedly discovered, un-relied on, truncated deposition statement by Johnson in 
an entirely different judicial system which, by the way, was never even mentioned to the 
presiding federal judge in the case, which was purchased by Orvis with money embezzled 
from the partnership, is an inconsistent statement, it nonetheless does not negate, rebut or 
vitiate any element of the partnership between Johnson and Orvis. Such an allegedly 
inconsistent statement might possibly go to credibility. But to get this statement noticed in 
any dispositive way, Orvis must erect it on the scaffolding of judicial estoppel, but several 
levels of that scaffolding did not arrive in the truck. The "inconsistent statement" is useless 
to Orvis otherwise. Before Johnson as the non-moving party need take regard of this tortured 
little statement, it must meet and Orvis must argue, every element of judicial estoppel. Orvis 
may not merely assert an inconsistent statement and announce that it rebuts an actual defined 
element of the partnership doctrine. It does not. This tortured and hotly disputed single 
statement cannot as a naked phrase enter the front gates of our judicial consciousness unless 
it is formally draped in the full robes of judicial estoppel. It may seek admittance through a 
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back door by standing in line with other credibility impeachers, but it will have to elbow 
through that narrow back door called relevance and then be assessed by a jury. 
In Orvis' Brief, each of the dozen or so times Orvis insists that the moving party may 
shift the burden by arguing a deficiency in an essential element of the non-moving party's 
legal claim, Orvis averts his eyes and leaps over the gaping hole in his own argument below. 
He omitted to address any element of partnership claims. Instead, Orvis points to a phrase 
that must be bolstered by a different doctrine, judicial estoppel, and unfortunately, he also 
forgot and omitted to argue the elements of judicial estoppel. 
The defect in Orvis' analysis of summary judgment as to judicial estoppel is 
highlighted by the paraphrasing as he does the requirements of Rule 56, on p. 19 of his brief 
that, "Once a moving party has properly supported her [sic] motion as required by Rule 
56(c), Rule 56(c) shifts the burden to the nonmoving party and requires him to respond with 
evidence *set[ing] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' 
[emphasis added]." The properly supported prima facie case was never made to begin with 
to even reach the academic discussion of whether initial burdens or ultimate burdens or 
burden shifting should apply.1 Orvis makes a contorted claim that a movant can either satisfy 
its burden of proof "that there are no genuine issues of material fact and judgment in the 
moving party's favor is therefore warranted as a matter of law" or where as here, in trying 
to defeat a counterclaim, that the moving party "satisfies its initial burden by challenging the 
nonmoving party's ability to prove an essential element of its case on the basis that no 
Record 1940-1948 and 1957-1964 
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genuine issue of material fact exists as to that element/' p. 16. He then alleges that the 
existence of an Orvis-Johnson business partnership is defeated by application of the doctrine 
of judicial estoppel by mere assertion of a prior inconsistent statement without more which 
defeats Johnson's counterclaim. The problem is there are several missing links in this 
tautology, apart from disputes of fact. 
Orvis' argument begins with this unfounded assumption that he made out a prima 
facie to support summary judgment on the claim of judicial estoppel. This is simply not true. 
Orvis did not for the most part even allege facts to provide support for each element required 
to establish judicial estoppel, indeed he has argued some of them are not or should not be 
considered as elements. The required elements of Utah law are namely: 1) the party opposing 
judicial estoppel seeks to deny a position he or she took in a prior judicial proceeding [i.e. 
a prior inconsistent statement or position]; 2) the prior and subsequent judicial proceedings 
involve the same parties or their privies; 3) the prior and subsequent judicial proceedings 
involve the same subject matter; 4) the party seeking judicial estoppel in the subsequent 
judicial proceeding must have relied on the former testimony; 5) the position must have been 
successfully maintained in the former action and 6) the party against whom judicial estoppel 
is sought must have exhibited bad faith in making an intentional misrepresentation, Tracy 
Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Investment Co., 132 P. 2d 388 (Utah 1942) as supplemented 
by 3D Constr. &Dev., L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., Ill P. 3d 1082 (Utah 2005). 
The missing elements 2-6 Orvis either ignores or claims need not be alleged because 
Johnson in opposing summary judgment did not raise them. The Court of Appeals panel 
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decision did not even bother to analyze two necessary elements - bad faith and reliance, 
falsely claiming these had not been raised below (refuted in discussion below) and were 
therefore "waived." This posture presents the peculiar anomaly of claiming a moving party 
can be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law without even sustaining all of the elements 
of a claim under the law. The analysis given to the existence of a prior inconsistent statement 
was woefully superficial and refuted by the record or the law as were the elements of same 
parties or privies, same subject matter and successful maintenance. The failure of Orvis to 
raise and factually support necessary elements of judicial estoppel is only overcome as the 
panel seems to indicate by (incorrectly) asserting that these necessary elements of the 
doctrine need not be pled or presented by Orvis, the moving party. This is clear error. This 
is contorted logic that a party can raise a legal claim with six elements and prevail by 
asserting facts supporting only one of them then relying on an opposing party's alleged 
failure to point out the defect in "properly supporting" the motion to begin with, while also 
ignoring Johnson did raise the missing elements in the trial court, argued them and briefed 
them. Moreover, the panel and Orvis sidestepped the very real and substantial dispute as to 
that one fact as to whether that prior real estate partnership statement was in fact inconsistent 
with Johnson's current position by weighing the disputed evidence and Johnson's motive, 
credibility and inferring intent. 
b. The Court of Appeals burden shifting stands summary judgment on its head 
as a moving party always has the burden and weighing evidence is province of jury. 
In order to reach this issue, it must be overlooked that no "initial burden" or prima 
facie case was alleged by Orvis to begin with. Thus, to a large extent this is something of an 
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advisory opinion on this issue which need not be reached because it is not ripe. This has 
previously not been favored in this Court, "Houghton v. Department of Health, 125 P.3d 860 
(Utah 2005) quoting Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 86 P.3d 735 (Utah 2004), "We have 
observed on many occasions that this court is not inclined to issue mere advisory opinions," 
or as stated in State v. Ortiz, 987 P.2d 39 (Utah 1999): 
Where there exists no more than a difference of opinion regarding the hypothetical 
application of a piece of legislation to a situation in which the parties might, at some 
future time, find themselves, the question is unripe for adjudication. 
Orvis argues that either Rule 56 already requires a burden shifting or if it does not, 
this Court should adopt the Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317 (1986) summary judgment 
burden shifting analysis. Orvis claims this Court did adopt a burden shifting analysis in 
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 P.3d 1054 (Utah 2002). Waddoups while having 
originally arose from a summary judgment was an appeal of a dismissal of an amended 
complaint decided under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss rather than a Rule 56 motion for 
summary judgment and involved choice of law and conflicts of law issues readily 
distinguishable from anything involved in this case. The language from Waddoups Orvis 
relies on is: 
However, once the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case 
on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the 
nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
Waddoups then went on to discuss the elements of the legal claims for interference with 
prospective economic advantage, and conspiracy which were missing from the Plaintiffs 
complaint. This is not really what is present in the instant case at all. Orvis did not literally 
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challenge "an element" of Johnson's counterclaims for partnership accounting and 
embezzlement. Instead he is invoking a doctrine to prevent even looking at any element of 
the partnership accounting claim and it is that doctrine which is the subject matter of this 
appeal, not the substantive claim. Orvis challenges the existence of the partnership despite 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, including his lawsuit seeking to avoid it. 
Every analysis of summary judgment agrees on the same starting place of analysis, 
the existence of two requirements - no dispute of material facts and entitlement to a judgment 
as a matter of law based on those undisputed facts. Orvis and the Court of Appeals panel 
ignore both of these fundamentals. Apart from allocating burdens of proof on a summary 
judgment motion of initial burden, opposing, ultimate and any others, the concept is far too 
simplistic and incomplete for what is involved in applying for and opposing a summary 
judgement. An opponent of a summary judgement may oppose a summary judgment in at 
least three ways: 1) if the movant has not established any proof of one or more of the 
elements of the claim for which judgment is sought [as herein], then the opponent has no 
burden at all other than to argue the law - that the movant would not be entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law, and facts are almost irrelevant at that point; 2) if the movant has presented 
material facts of each element of claim, i.e. a properly supported claim, which on their face 
might entitle the movant to a judgment, then the opponent may dispute some of the material 
facts alleged by movant; or 3) the opponent might allege sufficient other additional material 
facts as to elements of the legal claims involved without controverting any of the movant's 
facts. 
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The problem with calling this "burden shifting" is, despite what Orvis claims, that 
identified by Judge Bench's concurring opinion in this case and his dissent in Shaw Res. Ltd., 
L.L. C. v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P. C., 142 P. 3d 560 (Utah App. 2002) that "the burden 
in federal courts has been shifted to the nonmoving party, aligning the 'movant's production 
burden for summary judgment to the burden of proof that party would bear at trial.'" This 
burden shifting notion is akin to the ultimate burden of proof at trial because inherent in the 
concept is weighing evidence, sifting conflicting claims, evaluating credibility, motive, 
intent, etc. - all traditionally rigorously abhorred in motions for summary judgment, 
Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323 (Utah 2005); Winegarv. Froereret. al, 
813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah 
App. 1996); Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Orvis goes on to invoke this Court's rule-making powers to adopt such a burden 
shifting rule to apply to this case where it could not be invoked due to failure to "properly 
support" each element of a prima facie case to begin with. The burden in a Rule 56 motion 
is a simple yes or no question - are there material facts in dispute or not? Only if material 
facts are not in dispute, then do they entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law? Orvis 
has not even attempted to meet the established elements required by this Court to overturn 
prior precedent, State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994): 
We will not overturn precedent "unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally 
erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good 
than harm will come by departing from precedent." Id. at 399 (quoting John Hanna, 
The Role of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill. L.Rev. 367, 367 (1957) ). 
Orvis instead argues that Utah should adopt this analysis because other courts do. 
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They recite as grounds therefore the same grounds that support the use of summary judgment 
to begin with - overworked courts and rooting out deficient or unsupported claims. This is 
not an additional reason to promulgate a new standard of proof which disregards prior 
precedent for summary judgments relying on the common meaning of the plain language of 
the rule - "The judgment sought shall be rendered if... there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." A 
summary judgment is not the time to determine who has the better evidence, but only to 
determine whether any opposing evidence exists. 
ISSUE NO, 2: THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT CORRECTLY 
APPLY THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD IN THIS CASE, 
Orvis' argument supporting summary judgment relies on the policy behind judicial 
estoppel and a perceived prior inconsistent statement. Without bothering to argue why 
alleging only one of six required elements would entitle him to judgment as "a matter of 
law/' he simply claims Johnson did not create a dispute of fact as to the prior inconsistent 
statement and waived the remaining elements - both false assertions. 
a. The single element of judicial estoppel alleged by Orvis - prior inconsistent 
statement - was subject to a genuine dispute. 
The fact that the parties are here before the Utah Supreme Court arguing about the 
meaning, intent and content of facts demonstrates the existence of a dispute of material fact. 
The problem with the Orvis and Court of Appeals analysis is that they would remove these 
issues of dispute from the jury and allow the trial judge to determine credibility and weigh 
evidence. In his opening brief, Orvis for the first time in the record of this case recites the full 
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text of alleged prior inconsistent statement made by Johnson in his deposition to the SBA. 
He still overlooks the other preceding parts of that deposition where this very partnership and 
related business ventures were explored in excruciating detail. Yet he simply asks this Court 
to say "black is white" and that the quoted text does not mean exactly what it says. He says 
there is nothing to support Johnson's assertion that the following quote refers only to real 
estate ventures: 
Q. Do you have any interest in any partnership? 
A. No, I mean you know, often I'll have a joint endeavor with somebody but I don't 
have a partnership or set up a partnership or an L.L.C. You know if I get a deal I say, 
[h]ey, do you want to do this deal together? We'll go up to Summit County and buy 
a lot. [Emphasis added] 
(Record p. 2424; 1231-1232, Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition, p. 30 lines 16-25 and p. 31, 
lines 1-24). 
One easy place to analyze the plain meaning of this statement is to read all of the 
words in the entire quote used themselves. Johnson explicitly referenced "lots" and specific 
real estate ventures he had engaged in previously, for instance, in Summit County. Orvis 
argues this can only be interpreted the way he wants it to be to create an inconsistent 
statement, without any reference to the surrounding testimony in that and prior days' 
depositions, the actual text of the answer and Johnson's subjective intent and meaning of his 
answer as well his understanding of the question - i.e. highly fact dependent questions. 
Johnson has documented the nature of his interpretation of the question and answer in his 
affidavit, supporting exhibits, arguments below and his prior brief herein. The District Court 
and the Court of Appeals both adopted the Orvis interpretation of this quote and granted and 
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upheld summary judgment respectively. 
Orvis and the Court of Appeals continue to claim despite a record to the contrary, 
"Nothing in Johnson's affidavit supports his assertion that his response in the SBA 
deposition to the question about partnerships was based on his belief that it referred only to 
partnerships in real estate," which assertion is defied by the plain language of the full quote 
itself, much less the context in which it arose. To be satisfied of one set of facts over another 
involves a weighing of the two sets of facts. This of course is not permissible, as a matter of 
law, on a motion for summary judgment. Winegar v. Froerer et aL, supra. The disparate 
meanings of the SBA quote are a central focus of the case rendering it not susceptible to 
summary judgment. 
b. The Orvis9 failure to plead or allege facts supporting the remaining missing 
elements of judicial estoppel defeat application of the doctrine, 
i. Contrary to Orvis' assertion reliance can be or was waived, reliance is a 
critical and indispensable requirement for judicial estoppel 
Orvis claims he need not present a necessary element of judicial estoppel because 
Johnson did not argue it was an element and did not preserve the issue below. This overlooks 
the requirements of Rule 56 that Orvis present facts showing he is entitled to judgment "as 
a matter of law" but also ignores the record below and on appeal. This claim that Johnson did 
not raise reliance is simply false. Johnson did clearly raise it in argument and by citing the 
specific cases calling for it in his pleadings.2 For example, at the hearing before Judge Hanson 
on the elements necessary to support judicial estoppel which are lacking herein, counsel stated 
2R. 2279-2281, R. 2508 -Tr. p. 18,1. 103, 23-24, p. 19,1. 3-12 
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at R 2708 - Tr. p. 18,1. 1-2, "that's another party, that detrimentally changed its position by 
reason of Salt Lake's inaccurate representation of Utah's water law in progress," and at R. 
2708 - Tr. p. 19,1.3-6, "The party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed 
its position. Here there's been zero reliance by Mr. Orvis" [Emphasis added]. Orvis' attorney 
responded and also argued reliance to the trial court at R. 2708, Tr. p. 34,1. 20-25. Johnson's 
Memorandum to the District Court cited the cases of Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
34 P. 3d 180 (Utah 2001), Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731 (Utah 
1995), and Tracy, supra, for the elements of judicial estoppel, which all require reliance. 
Judicial estoppel is also inapplicable herein as additionally held in connection with reliance 
by Silver Fork, "The rule of judicial estoppel does not apply . . . when the knowledge or 
means of knowledge of both parties is equal." Orvis per se would have equal or better 
knowledge about his partnership with Johnson. 
Nonetheless, as the majority of this Court has consistently determined, as with any 
form of estoppel, an essential element of judicial estoppel is detrimental reliance. The 
District Court and Court of Appeals ignored this reliance element altogether. In Masters v. 
Worsley, supra, the Court of Appeals reiterated the Supreme Court's holding on this issue: 
In Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509,132 P.2d 388, 390 
(1942), the Utah Supreme Court said that a party invoking judicial estoppel must 
show that he or she has done something or omitted to do something in reliance on the 
other party's testimony in the earlier proceeding, and will be prejudiced if the facts are 
different from those upon which he or she relied. Id. However, "there is no estoppel 
where there was no reliance and the parties had equal knowledge of the facts." Id. at 
390-91. However, in Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 
(1971), the court clarified that the doctrine was really akin to collateral estoppel and 
applied only to issues actually litigated, not those which merely could have been 
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determined. [Emphasis added.] 
There is no evidence of reliance by Orvis on the SBA quote - detrimental or 
otherwise. Summary judgment must be reversed because Orvis failed to plead or prove this 
essential element of judicial estoppel. "There is no estoppel where there was no reliance" is 
the controlling principal here. The failure to allege any prima facie case that includes 
reliance, much less provide even nominal facts in support of this essential element of reliance 
renders the doctrine of judicial estoppel wholly inapplicable as a matter of law. For this 
reason alone, the District Court and Court of Appeals have committed manifest error. 
ii. Orvis' claim to be a privy of the SBA is false. 
Orvis simply make a naked assertion that Johnson created no dispute of material fact 
that Orvis was privy of the SBA. Such assertion defies both the record and the law. Orvis 
asserts simply because it was admitted that he received an assignment of the SBA judgment 
he becomes ipso facto a privy. This ignores the issue in dispute -purchase of the assignment 
of the judgment through a sham dissolved LLC using embezzled partnership funds which 
make the judgment property of the partnership, not Orvis personally. 
Johnson has asserted from the outset that Orvis purchased the judgment with monies 
wrongfully taken from the partnership and stated this in his Affidavit in Opposition to 
Summary Judgment, HH4,52,53 and 54.3 This was supported by sworn deposition testimony 
of Orvis employee Thomas Triplett (Record p.855-875), Orvis partner Jade Griffin (Record 
p. 877-884), and attorney Lawrence employee, Will Vigil (Record p. 2285-2288). The facts 
3Record 2267, 2280 
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of record show that the SBA judgment was purchased by an expired and defunct Utah limited 
liability company, All Star Financial, LLC (owned by a relative of an Orvis partner and party 
herein-Deon Stoeckling). All Star was used by Orvis to conceal his identity from the SBA.4 
Within 24 hours after the purchase, All Star assigned the SBA judgment to Orvis. Orvis used 
the Johnson profit share monies to pay the SBA. This plan was proposed and orchestrated 
by Victor Lawrence with Orvis. Lawrence, as Johnson's attorney to the SBA, knew the 
amount Johnson was negotiating with the SBA to pay to settle the judgment and that was the 
amount Orvis paid.5 
Whether the purchaser of the judgment is a privy to the SBA is not the dispute raised 
with respect to Orvis' party or privy status, but instead that Orvis used embezzled partnership 
money to purchase the SBA judgment and used a defunct "straw man" to disguise his 
identity. Johnson pointed out to the District Court and Court of Appeals that Orvis could not 
be a privy because Orvis does not actually own the SBA judgment. Having been purchased 
with misappropriated partnership funds, under well established Utah law, the SBA judgment 
would be the property not of Orvis but of the partnership, even if held in Orvis' name. 
Utah statute and case law are well-established and long-standing that assets purchased 
with partnership monies, even if the assets are held in the name of an individual partner, are 
the property of the partnership. Utah Code Anno. §48-1-5 provides, in part, "Unless the 
contrary intention appears, property acquired with partnership funds is partnership property." 
4
 Record 2256-2257; 2280-2281 
5
 See also Record 2098-2101, 2285-2367, 2389-2394 
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As previously noted to this Court and not addressed by Orvis, this statute's substance has 
uniformly been the holding of Utah courts on partnership property beginning with Deming 
v. Moss, 123 P. 971 (Utah 1912): 
The law with respect to what, prima facie at least, constitutes partnership property as 
between partners is well stated in 22 A. & E. Ency., L. (2d Ed.) 91, in the following 
words: "All property brought with funds belonging to a firm is, prima facie at least, 
the property of the partnership, though the title to such property be taken in the 
individual names of one or more of the partners." 
See Frandsen v. Holladay, 739 P.2d 1111,1113 (Utah App. 1987). Deming was quoted as 
standing for the rule that is "settled in this jurisdiction" and "amply supported by numerous 
authorities" in Staats v. Staats, 226 P. 677 (Utah 1924). Utah's current statute was referenced 
in Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P. 2d 606 (Utah 1976): 
Our statute provides that when property is purchased with partnership funds it 
becomes property of the partnership, unless a contrary intention is shown. This is true 
regardless of the form of the transaction, including where the purchase is made in the 
name of one or more of the partners as individuals without reference to the 
partnership. 
Accordingly, this would make the partnership a "privy" of the SBA, not Orvis. Since this is 
a genuine factual issue raised below that had to be tried, this element of whether the parties 
are the same or privies precludes summary judgment as a matter of law. It is not permissible 
to weigh two versions of facts on a motion for summary judgment, Winegar v. Froerer et 
aly supra. These are all substantial and material issues of fact raised below but ignored by 
the District Court and the Court of Appeals in its grant of summary judgment to Orvis. 
iii. Contrary to Orvis' assertion, the subject matter of the prior federal case is 
different from the subject matter of the present state case. 
The prior case was a contract guarantee action and a foreclosure deficiency action 
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brought by the SBA against Johnson.6 Orvis claims that because the purpose of the 
deposition was to identify assets for collecting on the SBA judgment, that subject matter 
makes the subject matter of the lawsuit the same as the instant case regarding partnership 
embezzlement by Orvis and an accounting therefor. This is simply a stretch. The subject 
matters of the prior federal action and this state action are clearly different. Orvis engages 
in a fiction or disregards the actual content of this element to claim the subject matter of the 
two unrelated lawsuits were the same by claiming that the issue of the existence of the Orvis-
Johnson partnership was in dispute regardless of the actual "subject matter" of the litigation 
itself. 
Orvis distinguished the "actually litigated" requirement from Masters v. Worsley, 
supra, wherein the Court of Appeals stated the Utah Supreme Court had clarified the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel by holding that "the doctrine [judicial estoppel] was really akin 
to collateral estoppel and applied only to issues actually litigated, not those which could have 
been determined;' tiling Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044,1046 (1971) 
by claiming it related only to collateral estoppel and not judicial estoppel. The Richards case 
was indeed a case about collateral estoppel, however, Masters expressly adopted this 
requirement precisely to define judicial estoppel. The only subject matter litigated, and thus 
cognizable for application of judicial estoppel, in the prior SBA action were the foreclosure 
action and the guarantee contract. The specific Orvis-Johnson business relationship in this 
6The SBA extensively litigated mortgage deficiency action centered primarily on 
the issue of whether the differing federal limitation period for pursuing SBA backed 
mortgage deficiencies trumped Utah's three month trust deed statute limitation period. 
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case was not litigated in the prior SBA action, and so, Orvis fails the "same subject matter" 
test. He may not invoke judicial estoppel. 
iv. Orvis' claim the Johnson position was "successfully maintained" in federal 
court for judicial estoppel to apply is false. 
Orvis overlooks the failure to have ever pled this element to begin with by claiming 
"it is undeniable . . . that . . . the SBA was unable to collect on its judgment." This is indeed 
very deniable, as pointed out in Johnson's brief. In fact, it indulges rank speculation to 
presume the SBA sat passive not collecting because they relied on a claim Johnson had no 
partnership with Orvis. There is simply no fact to support this proposition. Instead, quite the 
contrary is shown. Neither Orvis nor the Court of Appeals knows what the SBA did or did 
not do and there was no evidence presented by Orvis or facts alleged regarding this. 
Moreover, the SBA did collect on its judgment.7 The SBA actually did collect on its 
judgment for the exact amount negotiated with Johnson. Indeed, Orvis himself paid the SBA 
and in fact, paid the exact amount that Johnson had negotiated with the SBA to pay off the 
SBA judgment. 
Orvis somewhat confuses "successfully maintain" with "actually litigated, although 
both may be required." As explained in 3D Const, and Development, L.L.C. v. Old Standard 
Life Ins. Co., supra: 
"Under judicial estoppel, 'a person may not, to the prejudice of another person, deny 
any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same persons or their 
privies involving the same subject matter, if such prior position was successfully 
maintained.'" Nebeker v. State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, 26, 34 P.3d 180 (quoting 
Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388, 390 
7see R. 2282, 1150, R. 2508 - Tr. p. 17,1.10-14 
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(1942)) Moreover, judicial estoppel is inappropriate where the party against 
whom judicial estoppel is sought did not successfully maintain the inconsistent 
position in the prior proceedings. SeeStevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339,353 (Utah 
1996) (explaining "the rule followed in Utah requires that the party seeking judicial 
relief must have prevailed upon its statement in the earlier proceeding."). 
Thus, it is not a matter of having necessarily actually litigated a position, but that the 
position have been put before the Court, tried and tested in a courtroom and adopted by the 
Court and maintained by the party asserting it. This is substantially more than a cast off 
phrase in a deposition by a party. It is error to suggest that a non-action by the SBA 
constitutes having successfully maintained a position of "no partnership"with Orvis or 
having "prevailed" before the Honorable U.S. District Court Judge Bruce Jenkins, the federal 
judge presiding over the SBA case. Judge Jenkins never considered or ruled upon the 
position. This element of "successful maintenance" of an issue requires that the prior federal 
court not only have actually reviewed and relied on the position, but the party asserting the 
position (Johnson) "prevailed" on that issue before the court. The District Court and the 
Court of Appeals again ignored an essential element of judicial estoppel. 
v. Orvis failed to address Johnson's purported prior statement to the SBA, if 
inconsistent, was the result of inadvertence or mistake, not bad faith. 
Orvis again seeks refuge that a necessary legal element of his claim for relief under 
judicial estoppel need not be met because Johnson did not raise it below. This simply defies 
the requirement of being entitled to a judgment based upon undisputed facts "as a matter of 
law." The law requires six elements, not one. Yet to claim that Johnson did not raise this as 
an element simply ignores every pleading and argument and memorandum he has filed 
throughout the litigation from his initial counterclaim to his counter-affidavit to the summary 
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judgment, forward.8 Mere inadvertence or mistake in making an inconsistent statement is not 
sufficient to sustain judicial estoppel. There must be "bad faith" to invoke judicial estoppel 
as discussed, infra, as well as all other essential elements. The SBA answer was at most a 
mistake and there is not any evidence of bad faith. 
If Johnson's answer, based upon his misunderstanding of the scope of the question, 
was indeed "no interest in any partnership whatsoever including business dealings with Orvis 
which we have already discussed at length," this clearly falls within the definition of 
"mistake"as set forth in Utah Coal and Lumber Restaurant, Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors 
Unlimited, 40 P.3d 581 (Utah 2001): 
Indeed, [a] mistake within the meaning of equity is a non-negligent but erroneous 
mental condition, conception, or conviction induced by ignorance, misapprehension, 
or misunderstanding, resulting in some act or omission done or suffered by one or 
both parties, without its erroneous character being intended or known at the time. 27A 
Am.Jur.2d Equity § 7 (1996). We acknowledged this principle over seventy years ago 
in Provo Reservoir Co. v. Tanner, 68 Utah 21, 25-26, 249 P. 118,119 (1926), 
This is an appeal of Judge Hanson's decision. Whether Johnson had raised this 
element or not, Judge Hanson certainly made an explicit finding of its presence from which 
Johnson is entitled to appeal. Judge Hanson's finding of "no mistake" while an improper 
weighing of evidence and credibility, does not ipso facto meet the "bad faith"element for 
judicial estoppel required by 3D Const, and Development, L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. 
Co., supra, however, but even assuming for purpose of argument that Judge Hanson's ruling 
does incorporate "bad faith," the most critical defect of Judge Hanson's presumption of "bad 
faith" in terms of this summary judgment with opposing views established in the record, was 
8
 Record p. 2261 
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the well-established principle expressed in Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 122 P.3d 556 
(Utah 2005): 
'[A] finding of bad faith turns on a factual determination of a party's subjective 
intent.' Id. [Utah Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1198 n. 6 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991)] (citing Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 n. 3 (Utah 
1998)). 
Still Standing also explicitly states that making a presumption of bad faith in the absence of 
evidence is impermissible. No such factual determination was made, and given these parties' 
positions, is one which will clearly be in dispute. 
c. Contrary to Orvis' false assertion, Johnson's public policy and 
partnership accounting argument that judicial estoppel may not be used to preclude 
discovery of the truth were squarely raised in the Court of Appeals, 
The claim that Johnson never asserted that judicial estoppel may not be used to 
preclude discovery of the truth again ignores every pleading he filed in the Court of Appeals. 
His initial Appellant's Brief contained an Argument VI entitled "ORVIS-JOHNSON 
PARTNERSHIP. A. The Orvis-Johnson partnership is clear and well documented and the 
district court should be required to require an accounting of the partnership immediately." 
Johnson's Appellant's Reply Brief contained an Argument II.E. entitled "Orvis is Barred 
From Invoking the Doctrine to Block the Truth Herein." Orvis' deceit and embezzlement was 
raised before the trial court in part as to why judicial estoppel should not apply, R. 2708, Tr. 
p. 20,1.1-6. It was argued in Johnson's Affidavit and Memorandum, see e.g. R. 2243,2262. 
Orvis' contrary claim like most of his other arguments are simply refuted if the true 
pleadings and record are examined and not what Orvis mischaracterizes them as being. It is 
simply not credible to assert that Johnson's position that judicial estoppel cannot be used to 
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block discovery of the truth must be overlooked in this Court or to conceal the 
embezzlement, fraud and misappropriation of partnership funds by Orvis. 
CONCLUSION 
Orvis has failed to properly support a motion for summary judgement with all 
elements required to invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel. His opening Brief mis-states 
the record and provides mere argument about what the law should be rather than what the 
law was at the time Judge Hanson rendered his improper Order. Based upon the foregoing, 
this Court is respectfully urged to reverse the Court of Appeals and District Court and to 
remand this to District Court for a trial on the merit. 
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